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Richard Swinburne’s recent book Mind, Brain, & Free Will is a welcomed 
addition to the discussion of philosophical anthropology by those of 
us who are not convinced by physical or material accounts of human 
persons. And though the book makes an  important argument for 
substance dualism, it has much to say about other important aspects 
of philosophy as well. As Swinburne notes, Mind, Brain, & Free Will 
advances, develops, and occasionally re-directs many of the arguments 
he first gave in The Evolution of the Soul.
In Mind, Brain, & Free Will, Swinburne’s primary objective is to 
argue for a  substance dualist perspective of human persons. On this 
view, persons are pure mental substances (or souls), which are distinct 
from any physical parts or properties and also distinct from any 
specific mental properties. In his words: ‘Each person has a “thisness”, 
a uniqueness, which makes them the person they are quite apart from 
the particular mental properties they have and any physical properties 
(and any thisness) possessed by their body.’1 In this view, the soul of 
a person is her essential part, while the body is hers only contingently. 
He adds, ‘My soul therefore carries my “thisness”. However – given the 
normal understanding of a  human being on earth as constituted (in 
part) by a  body  – it follows that humans, unlike other possible pure 
mental substances such as ghosts or poltergeists, each have their body as 
a contingent part.’2
1 Richard Swinburne, Mind Brain, & Free Will (Oxford: Oxford, 2013), p. 165.
2 Ibid., p. 170.
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As one who comes from a Thomistic perspective, there is much to 
Swinburne’s book with which I agree. For example, I too think that we 
really do have immaterial souls that are different from our physical 
bodies and that we are capable of disembodied existence and surviving 
death. I differ with Professor Swinburne, however, over what constitutes 
a  person and the contingency of our bodies. In my view, substance 
dualism seems to diminish the important role of the human body. But, 
my motives for that position are largely theological in nature, and as such 
I will focus on other things in this review.
For the remainder of this review, I will focus my comments on specific 
places in Swinburne’s Mind, Brain & Free Will where I  find myself 
unconvinced or having significant questions. Two such places come to 
mind: (1) Swinburne’s gradual brain replacement thought experiment – 
what I take to be an important part of his overall argument in chapter 
six for substance dualism, and (2) the place and importance of mental 
properties in Swinburne’s view of what it means to be a particular person.
SWINBURNE AND GRADUAL BRAIN REPLACEMENT
An  important piece of Swinburne’s case for substance dualism is his 
argument from the possibility of gradual brain replacement over time. 
He asks us to consider the following possibility:
Suppose that P1 undergoes an operation in which a small diseased part of 
his or her brain (a tenth of the whole brain) is replaced by a similar part 
from another brain (perhaps that of a clone of P1) .... But now suppose 
that each year a different tenth of P1’s brain is removed and replaced by 
similar parts from another brain (perhaps that of a different clone of P1 
on each occasion). At the end of ten years there is a person whose brain is 
made of entirely different matter. It seems at least logically possible that – 
because the process has been gradual and each new part has become 
integrated into the brain before a new operation is done – the resulting 
person is still P1.3
Swinburne then adds a  further condition: ‘Now suppose that during 
each of the ten operations in which brain parts are replaced, the patient 
remained conscious and has a series of overlapping conscious experiences 




At t1, Bob is conscious and his brain is composed of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, & 10.
Then,
At t2, Bob is still conscious, but his brain has part 1 replaced by 
part 11, such that his brain is now composed of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, & 11.
Supposing this process repeated itself once every year for ten years as 
Swinburne suggests, we would eventually end up with:
At t11, Bob is still conscious but his brain has part 10 replaced by 
part 20, such that his brain is now composed of parts 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, & 20.
It is important to note that Swinburne’s thought experiment postulates 
a gradual replacement of a brain over the course of ten years. During any 
given surgical procedure, no more than a tenth of the brain is removed 
and replaced. If this is really possible, then Swinburne thinks that each 
of us ‘can continue to exist without any continuity of brain, memory, or 
character. It follows that the simple theory of personal identity is true’.4
This is an  intriguing thought experiment that  – according to 
Swinburne – leads us to substance dualism. Yet, physicalists are unlikely 
to be persuaded by this argument. I for one – though not a physicalist 
myself – suspect that this argument is built upon an unstated assumption 
about consciousness itself. That is, it seems like this would only favour 
substance dualism if it were impossible – in the first place – for purely 
physical organisms to have conscious experiences. If they cannot have 
consciousness, then an  organism going through the surgical process 
Swinburne describes is not conscious and does not have overlapping 
conscious experiences. As such, there is no person and no particular 
human identity. But if purely physical organisms can have conscious 
experience  – which is something he does not seem to say much 
about – then they may also be able to endure the kind of gradual brain 
replacement that Swinburne describes while also remaining conscious 
and having ‘overlapping conscious experiences lasting for the whole 
operation’. I  suspect that a  physicalist could account for these things 
for two reasons: First, this scenario is significantly analogous to the 
metabolic process our bodies use to gradually replace parts over time; 
4 Ibid., p. 158.
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Second, some physicalist philosophers have already developed theories 
that seem to allow for this very thing.
Consider the similarity between Swinburne’s surgical process and 
the metabolic process our body employs to replace old parts with new 
parts over time. Physical organisms replace parts – through metabolic 
processes – all the time without ceasing to be the beings that they are. 
And yet, this happens even though the vast amount of the parts that 
compose the body at an  earlier time are now gone and have been 
replaced by new parts. And yet, this happens while we are conscious 
and have overlapping conscious experiences. In short, we have our 
parts gradually replaced over time without losing consciousness or 
without ceasing to be the people that we are. Now if, through metabolic 
processes, physical organisms are able gradually to replace old material 
with new material over the course of time without ceasing to be the 
organisms that they are, then why wouldn’t this be possible in the case 
that Swinburne has sketched out in Mind, Brain, & Free Will? What if 
physical organisms have the ability to gradually ‘pass on’ their identity to 
the new parts as they come into the organism? What this would require 
us to say is that a particular stream of consciousness – or first person 
perspective  – is maintained by an  ever-changing physical organism 
that gradually replaces old parts with new parts. This clearly happens 
in the case of metabolic processes, so why couldn’t this also happen in 
the case a gradual brain replacement through a  surgical process? One 
might say that there is a  marked difference between the metabolic 
and surgical processes since one happens ‘naturally’ while the other is 
‘artificial’. But I suspect that this is not a sufficient difference since this is 
simply a difference in how the material arrives in the organism. Once it 
is there, the organism incorporates the material in the same way for both 
cases. All that is important here is that the physical organism be able to 
gradually change parts without the loss of consciousness or the life of the 
person in question.
Consider, also, some physicalists and materialists whose accounts 
of human persons might allow for Swinburne’s scenario. Again, in his 
account a given person (1) has the parts of her brain gradually replaced 
over ten years until the whole brain has been replaced, and (2) the 
person maintains consciousness throughout the surgeries and has 
overlapping conscious experiences. Can physicalists account for these 
things? I  suspect that Lynne Baker’s Constitution View just might. In 
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her approach, the capacity for first-person perspective is the essential 
criterion for what it means to be a  person. To be clear, having first-
person perspective is more than just having some mental property or 
memory. It is the ability that one has to think of herself as herself. Or 
as she explains, ‘A being with first-person perspective not only can have 
thoughts about herself, but she can also conceive of herself as the subject 
of such thought.’5 In other words, first-person perspective requires more 
than me being able to have desires, intentions and plans, it requires 
me to realize that it is me who has such desires, intentions and plans. 
In Baker’s Constitution View, a person can persist over time even if she 
does not have an immaterial soul, as long as she maintains first-person 
perspective. In other words, in light of changes in the human organism 
that constitutes a specific human person, Baker suggests that all that is 
necessary for the persistence of the person is continuity of first-person 
perspective and higher brain functions. She says, ‘Suppose that a person 
slowly had her organs replaced by nonorganic parts, to the point 
where there was no longer metabolism, circulation, digestion, and so 
on, but the higher brain function remained and the person’s sense of 
herself was uninterrupted. In this case, the person would persist but the 
organism would not.’6 And so, in Baker’s view, first-person perspective 
and higher brain function provide sufficient conditions for a person to 
persist over time. If her view is correct, then human persons – material 
persons  – could maintain their consciousness throughout the gradual 
brain replacement scenario that Swinburne describes. As such, Baker’s 
Constitution View might provide everything necessary to account for 
the persistence – and therefore survival – of a person who undergoes 
Swinburne’s gradual brain replacement.
Peter van Inwagen’s materialistic approach might also give materialists 
everything they need to reject Swinburne’s conclusions. Like Baker, his 
approach allows for the parts of a material organism to change over time 
and for the organism – in this case a person – to persist throughout the 
change as long as at each successive stage of the process, the given parts 
are caught up into the same life as the original organism. He calls this the 
Life principle:
5 Lynne Rudder Baker, ‘On Being One’s Own Person’, in Reasons of One’s Own, eds. 
Maureen Sie, Bert van Der Brink, and Marc Slors (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 
pp. 129-141 (p. 131).
6 Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A  Constitution View (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 19.
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If an organism exists at a certain moment, then it exists whenever and 
wherever  – and only when and only where  – the event that is its life 
at that moment is occurring; more exactly, if the activity of the xs at t1 
constitutes a life, and the activity of the ys at t2 constitutes a life, and the 
organism that the xs compose at t1 is the organism that the ys compose at 
t2 if and only if the life constituted by the activity of the xs at t1 is the life 
constituted by the activity of the ys at t2.7
Then, to clarify what Life would mean for the continuation of a particular 
material being, van Inwagen says:
Suppose that the activity of the xs constitutes a  life at t; suppose that 
a few of the xs cease to be caught up in that life and that the remnant 
continue to be caught up in a life; suppose that those of the xs that have 
ceased to be caught up in that life are ‘replaced’ – that certain objects, 
the ys, come to be caught up in the life the remnant of the xs are caught 
up in, in such a way that the ys and the remnant of the xs constitute that 
life. Suppose that this sort of replacement happens a sufficient number 
of times that eventually none of the xs is caught up in the life that has 
evolved, by continuous (and ‘insensible’, as Locke calls it) replacement of 
the xs, from the life that was once constituted by the activity of the xs. Is 
this life the life that was constituted by the xs?
In many cases, cases of the more usual sort, the answer is undoubtedly 
yes.8
Once again, this materialistic account of human persons allows for 
the gradual replacement of parts over time and for a person to persist 
through all of the changes that take place within her body. As such, 
I  suspect that the thought experiment offered by Swinburne does not 
establish substance dualism and that materialists would reject his overall 
argument. And, despite my sympathies with his perspective, I  am 
inclined to lean on other kinds of arguments that support the existence 
of the soul.
SWINBURNE AND MENTAL PROPERTIES
I also raise a second concern with Swinburne’s argument for substance 
dualism that, while not a  defeater for it, is at least epistemologically 
worrisome. As he makes clear throughout chapter 6, there are no physical 
7 Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1990), p. 145.
8 Ibid., p. 149.
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or mental properties that are essential to a particular person’s identity. 
That is, if Daphne at t2 is the same person named Daphne that was once at 
t1, then Daphne persists because she has the same ‘thisness’ as the earlier 
person named Daphne, and that ‘thisness’ is not tied to any particular 
mental property (psychological continuity) or physical property. He 
says, ‘I begin my defence of this position by arguing that it is logically 
possible that some person P2 at t2 can be the same person as a person P1 
at t1, even if he or she does not apparently remember anything done or 
experienced by P1 at t1 or earlier and has an entirely different character 
from P1, and also has a largely different body (including brain) from P1.’9 
He later adds:
Hence, given that an earlier person who had all the same physical parts 
as me, and all the same physical and mental properties as me, could, 
it is metaphysically possible, not be me, and could, it is metaphysically 
possible, be me, it follows that the difference must consist in the presence 
or absence of some non-physical part. I must now have a non-physical 
part (i.e. a part which is a pure mental substance) which makes me me, 
which the earlier person (even if they were in all other respects the 
same) would not have had if they had not been me. We may call this 
non-physical part of me my ‘soul’.10
So in short, Daphne’s persistence over time does not require the 
preservation of any of her mental properties (memories, characteristics, 
dispositions, etc.) or physical properties (particular body, particular 
body parts, particular brain, size, shape, etc.) across time. She could 
lose all her mental properties and physical properties and still be the 
same person she was at an earlier time. What is more, Daphne’s original 
physical and mental properties could appear later in some other person 
other than Daphne. As such, we could have the following situation. At t1, 
Daphne – who has the ‘thisness’ of Daphne – has the mental properties 
of 1, 2, and 3 and the physical properties X, Y, and Z. But, at t2, Daphne – 
who still has the ‘thisness’ of Daphne – loses all the mental properties (1, 
2, and 3) and physical properties (X, Y, and Z) that she once possessed, 
only to have them replaced by mental properties 4, 5, and 6 and physical 
properties A, B, and C. Running alongside Daphne’s life, at t1, Velma – 
who has the ‘thisness’ of Velma – has mental properties 4, 5, and 6 and 
9 Swinburne, Mind, Brain & Free Will, p. 151.
10 Ibid., p. 170.
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physical properties A, B, and C. Then at t2, Velma – who still has the 
‘thisness’ of Velma  – loses all the mental properties (4, 5, and 6) and 
physical properties (A, B, and C) that she once possessed only to have 
them replaced by mental properties 1, 2, and 3 and physical properties 
X, Y, and Z. So, just to clarify, we would have the following:
At t1:
Daphne has mental properties 1, 2, and 3 and physical properties 
X, Y, and Z.
Velma has mental properties 4, 5, and 6 and physical properties 
A, B, and C.
At t2:
Daphne has mental properties 4, 5, and 6 and physical properties 
A, B, and C.
Velma has mental properties 1, 2, and 3 and physical properties 
X, Y and Z.
Yet,
Daphne at t1 = Daphne at t2.
And,
Velma at t1 = to Velma at t2.
This is far more drastic than what would happen in Locke’s Prince 
and the Cobbler thought experiment. For on this account, persons may 
switch bodies (and thus physical properties), but they maintain all their 
mental properties (memories, dispositions, desires, etc.). And so while 
the Prince may be terribly confused about how he got into the Cobbler’s 
body (and vice versa), he is not confused about who he actually is. He 
remembers his life and possesses all the former mental properties that 
he once had. By contrast, Swinburne’s approach makes it possible to lose 
both the physical and the mental properties. I  can imagine that both 
Daphne and Velma at t2 are horribly confused about who they really are. 
At t2, Daphne is sure to think that she is Velma since she now has all of 
Velma’s old mental and physical properties, and Velma is sure to think 
that she is Daphne for the same reason. Both have become lost but are 
not even aware that it has happened. They are deceived into thinking that 
they are someone that they are not.
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My concern here is not with Swinburne’s contention that we have 
a  ‘thisness’ unique to each of us. My own Thomistic leanings incline 
me to think that we do have an immaterial soul, even if Swinburne and 
I might differ over the nature of that soul. My concern is with, on his 
model, our complete inability to identify ourselves across time given 
the contingency of our mental and physical properties. If Daphne has 
a complete loss and replacement of her mental and physical properties 
between t1 and t2, such that she now has all of Velma’s old mental and 
physical properties, then even Daphne will not be able to properly 
identify herself in the future. She will think she is Velma when in fact she 
is not. The same is true for Velma who would now have all Daphne’s old 
physical and mental properties and be equally confused and deceived. As 
I mentioned earlier, this is certainly not a logical defeater for Swinburne’s 
position, but it does seem to be a troubling and unfortunate consequence 
of it.
CONCLUSION
On the whole, Swinburne’s book is helpful and constructive. He has much 
to say about a number of important philosophical issues that need to be 
taken seriously. His critique of Thomas’ view of the soul has caused me 
to question my own approach. For this I am grateful and I look forward 
to working through this difficult issue. And his thought experiment for 
gradual brain replacement is intriguing and enlightening. In the end, 
however, I find myself unconvinced by some key parts of his argument 
and concerned about the way his approach dismisses mental and physical 
properties of human beings.
